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This document presents an evolution of the ROBERT protocol that decentralizes most
of its operations on the mobile devices1. DESIRE is based on the same architecture than
ROBERT but implements major privacy improvements. In particular, it introduces the
concept of Private Encounter Tokens, that are secret and cryptographically generated, to
encode encounters. In the DESIRE protocol, the temporary Identifiers that are broadcast
on the Bluetooth interfaces are generated by the mobile devices providing more control to
the users about which ones to disclose. The role of the server is merely to match PETs
generated by diagnosed users with the PETs provided by requesting users. It stores minimal
pseudonymous data. Finally, all data that are stored on the server are encrypted using keys
that are stored on the mobile devices, protecting against data breach on the server. All these
modifications improve the privacy of the scheme against malicious users and authority.
However, as in the first version of ROBERT , risk scores and notifications are still managed
and controlled by the server of the health authority, which provides high robustness, flexibility,
and efficacy.
∗Claude Castelluccia is the contact author. The other co-authors are listed in alphabetical order.
†The authors would like to thank Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Bruno Blanchet, and David Pointcheval for their comments and
suggestions about this paper.
1Available at https://github.com/ROBERT-proximity-tracing/documents
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1. Introduction
1.1. DESIRE: Leveraging the best of centralized and decentralized systems
Recent analysis have shown that current centralized and decentralized digital contact tracing proposals
come with their own benefits and risks [2, 16].
Centralized systems protect against malicious users, but a malicious server could abuse the system
by potentially re-identifying and tracing users’ locations. Conversely, decentralized systems make public
the ephemeral Bluetooth identifiers of diagnosed people, which could lead to mass surveillance by any
malicious individual [16]. Furthermore, decentralized systems introduce some fundamental trade-off
between availability, privacy, and integrity [13].
DESIRE explores a ”third way”, similarly to other proposals such as [1, 11], that aims at combining
the best of the two worlds. In particular, in DESIRE:
• mobile devices generate their own identifiers, their private encounter tokens (PET ), and keep full
control over them. These PET tokens are privately generated and unlinkable. This makes the
scheme less vulnerable to a malicious server compared to a scheme where the pseudo-identifiers are
generated by the back-end server.
• the server performs the matching between the PET tokens of infected and requesting users without
having access to their actual identifiers. Relying on a central server for the matching task improves
the robustness and resiliency of the scheme against malicious users, compared to a scheme where
the matching is performed by the devices themselves.
• the server computes the risk score which improves the efficacy of the system as the score function
can be instantly adapted by the health authority according to the evolution of the pandemics.
Furthermore, this allows the server to control the number of notifications that are sent out every day
and prevents uncontrollable situations where a high number of users get notified at once. Finally,
this also improves the security of the scheme against malicious users since users don’t get access to
the proximity information but only to the resulting risk scores.
1.2. Private Encounter Tokens (PETs)
As opposed to existing proximity tracing schemes, we propose an exposure notification system that is
based on Private Encounter Tokens (PETs), generated from Ephemeral Bluetooth Identifiers (EBID).
The EBIDs and PETs are generated and computed locally by the mobile devices and are unlinkable.
A PET token uniquely identifies an encounter between two nodes and is secret. They can be generated
from any Non-Interactive Key Exchange protocol (NIKE) [8], which makes them private and unlinkable
from the server [5].
In this report, the creation of the PET tokens is based on the Diffie/Hellman key exchange protocol [5].
For simplicity, and ease of reading, we describe our scheme using the multiplicative DH notation. However,
for efficiency reasons, we propose to implement it using an instance of the discrete logarithm on elliptic
curves (Curve25519). We assume that the devices share the same group structure (order p and generator
g), which could be pre-configured in the application.
At each epoch2 i:
• device A generates and broadcasts a new EBID defined as gX , where X is a secret generated by A.
With Elliptic Curve Cryptography and the elliptic curve Curve255193, gX requires 32 bytes which
are transmitted in 2 consecutive Bluetooth packets (See Section C).
• upon the reception of an EBID, gY , from a device B, device A computes (gY )X (which is equal to
gX·Y ) and stores in a local list4 the PET token H(gX·Y ), where H() a cryptographic hash function
such as SHA-256 . Similarly, device B computes (gX)Y (which is also equal to gX·Y ) and stores in
a local list the PET token H(gX·Y ) (see Figure 1).
The PET H(gX·Y ) is a unique and a secret identifier for the encounter between X and Y . Furthermore,
the decisional Diffie–Hellman (DDH) assumption guarantees that it can only be computed by A and B,
and is therefore protected from eavesdroppers [14].
2Epochs are synchronized with the device address randomisation periods.
3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curve25519
4As we will see later, each node actually maintains 2 lists to prevent linkability between the PETs that are used to query
the server and the PETs that are uploaded if the node is diagnosed positive.
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Figure 1: PET Generation
PET has the advantage over EBID that it reduces the ability of the server to link collocation
information coming from different individuals. Furthermore, this method mitigates “replay attack”, where
a malicious individual collects the EBIDs received by an infected (or potentially infected) individual and
replays them in many locations, thus creating a large number of false positives.
It is noteworthy that PET tokens are not specific to DESIRE and could benefit to other
existing proximity-tracing proposals.
1.3. Protocol Overview
All the notations used in this paper are summarized in Table 1. The proposed system is composed of users
who install the Exposure Notification Application using DESIRE, App, and a back-end server under the
control of the health authority. We assume that the server is configured with a well-known domain name,
certificate and is highly secured. All communications with the server are performed through proxies (to
hide users’ network metadata that could be exploited by the server to re-identify users).
Apps interact with the system through the four following procedures:
• Initialization: When a user wants to use the service, she installs the application, App, from an
official and trusted App store. App then registers to the server that generates a permanent identifier
(ID). IDTable keeps an entry for each registered ID. The stored information is “de-identified” i.e.,
by no mean, associated to a particular identity (no personal information is stored in IDTable).
• Proximity Discovery: After registering to the service, each device A:
– generates a new and unlinkable EBIDA at each epoch
– broadcasts this EBIDA regularly
– collects EBIDs of encountered devices
– generates PET tokens from collected EBIDs if certain conditions are satisfied on, for example,
contact length, received signal strength, etc.
– stores the generated PET tokens in a local list, along with, if necessary, additional metadata
(contact length, speed,...)5.
Figure 2 shows a schematic view of the exchanges performed during the Proximity Discovery
procedure described above, and will be described in greater detail in section 2.2.
• Infected User Declaration: When an individual is tested and diagnosed COVID-positive, and
after an explicit user consent and authorisation (from the medical services), her smartphone’s
application uploads its local list of generated PET tokens to the authority server, that adds them
in a global list, EList, of exposed PET tokens.
• Exposure Status Request: App queries (pull mechanism) the “exposure status” of its user by
probing regularly the server with its list of generated PET tokens. The server then checks how
many of the App’s tokens appear in EList and computes a risk score from this information (and
possibly other parameters, such the exposure duration and signal strength). If this score is larger
than a given threshold, the bit “1” (“at risk of exposure”) is sent back to the App, otherwise the
bit “0” is sent back. Upon reception of a message ”1”, a notification is displayed to the user that
indicates the instructions to follow (e.g., go the hospital for a test, call a specific phone number,
stay in quarantine, etc.).
5As described in Section2.2, the device actually uses 2 lists.
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Time-related Assumptions: This DESIRE protocol assumes that all the smartphones and the server
are loosely time-synchronized (thanks to NTP or any other time synchronisation mechanism like cellular
mobile phone network information, or GPS time information, etc.). Time is expressed as the NTP
“Seconds” value, which represents, for era 0, the number of seconds since 0h January 1st, 1900 UTC 6.
Time is discretized into epochs (e.g., of 15 minutes)7. We define as epoch duration sec the duration of
an epoch in seconds. Epochs are synchronized with the device address8 randomisation periods.
Roaming Considerations: Not considered in this version.
Table 1: Glossary of terms and variables used in this paper
Name Description
App Mobile application implementing DESIRE
AppA Mobile Application installed by user UA
ATA Authorization Token of user UA
BLE Bluetooth Low Energy
CT An upper-bound on the number of days a user who has been diagnosed
positive could been contagious (for example 14 days)
EBID Ephemeral Bluetooth IDentifier
EBIDA,i Ephemeral Bluetooth IDentifier generated by user UA at epoch i
EKA Encryption Key used of user UA to protect her information in table
IDTable
EList Exposed PET tokens list on the backend server, gathering encounters from
all users diagnosed COVID-positive who uploaded their PETs
epoch duration sec Duration of an epoch in seconds
ERSA Exposure Risk Score of user UA
ESR REQ Request sent by the App to query the user Exposure Status
ESR REP Reply message sent by the server to users to notify their Exposure Status
ETLA Exposure Token List maintained by AppA and used to upload her PETs if
user UA is diagnosed COVID-positive
IDA Permanent and anonymous identifier of user UA, stored by the server
IDTable Database maintained by the back-end server
LEPMA List of Exposed PET Metadata of user UA, stored in IDTable
PET Private Encounter Token
RTLA Request Token List maintained by AppA and used to upload her PETs
when user UA queries her exposure status
SREA Variable that indicates the last epoch when UA has sent a ”Status Request”
to the server, stored in IDTable
ESR min The minimum number of epochs between 2 consecutive ESR REQ
UNA Flag indicating if UA has already been notified to be at risk of exposure.
UNA is stored in the IDTable
1.4. Risk Scoring and Notification Considerations
Specific and effective risk scoring is out of scope of this paper. In this document, we assume that (1) the
server returns a binary reply informing users that they are at risk or not and (2) the reply is only based
on a calculated risk score value. These two assumptions need to be discussed. It might be useful, for
several reasons, to return a probability value instead of a binary information. Furthermore, adding some
randomness in the query reply mechanism could improve privacy (see Section B).
We further assume that the risk assessment algorithm and its parameters should be defined and
monitored by health authorities, in collaboration with epidemiologists. In addition, this algorithm should
be published with all relevant information to enhance trust and understanding by the users. It is also of
the utmost importance that the authority is able to adapt the algorithm and its parameters over time.
6https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network Time Protocol
7This value of 15 minutes is the rotation period of random address recommended in the Bluetooth v5.1 specification [10,
Vol 3, Part C, App. A]).
8Bluetooth device address is sometime called MAC address
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These adjustments are necessary to take into account the evolution of the situation, in particular the
number of exposed people, the number of infected people, the available resources, and also the progress
made by epidemiology research to understand the virus and its spread9. Indeed, a key success factor for
proximity tracing applications is their smooth integration within the existing health care infrastructure,
in particular the possibility to adapt the response to the local epidemiological situation and the available
resources [6]. This calls for a system where the exposure risk scores and the notifications are managed by
the server. The main driver of this approach is that it lets the health services run analytics on data and
send warnings only to those who are most at risk of having got infected. A major issue is the subsequent
management of the alerts, within the existing proximity tracing framework (which also involves manual
contact tracing, testing, quarantining, etc.). If the infrastructure is not sufficiently sized and equipped to
deal with all warnings, the proximity tracing application could be useless, anxiety-provoking (because of
the lack of care for individuals) and economically devastating (through the immediate, though unnecessary,
withdrawal of essential workers) [7]. The “centralized” approach to risk assessment and notifications
makes it possible to avoid excessive warnings that could lead either to panic reactions or loss of interest or
trust from the users.
Another benefit of the central role of the server is that it increases the resilience of the system against
attackers trying to identify infected users [2]. To summarize, digital proximity tracing tools should be
deployed as one element of a public health policy and should work in synergy with other existing measures
under the control of the public health authority. This is an essential functional requirement of any practical
exposure notification solution that seem to be incompatible with a true decentralized approach10.
2. DESIRE Protocol Description
2.1. Application Initialization
A user UA who wants to install the application on his device must download it from the official Apple or
Google Play Stores. After installing the application AppA, UA needs to register to the back-end server.
The registration phase is composed of two phases: the authorization token generation, during which the
user obtains an anonymous authorization token, and the user registration where the user registers to the
server anonymously.
As we will see these phases are unlinkable and provide full anonymity to user.
1. Authorization Token Generation: In this step, the user obtains an anonymous authorization token
that she uses in the User Registration phase. This could be performed by using blind signatures as
described in Appendix A.
2. User Registration: Once the user, UA, obtained an authorization token, ATA, she can use it to
register to the server. This is performed as follows:
a) UA sends a registration message which includes his authorization token, ATA.
b) The server verifies the authorization token, creates a unique identifier IDA and an entry in its
IDTable. The entry table contains for each registered user, the following information11:
-IDA (“Permanent IDentifier for A”): an identifier that is unique for each registered App,
and generated randomly (random draw process without replacement to avoid collision).
-UNA (“User A Notified”): this flag indicates if the associated user has already been notified
to be at risk of exposure (“true”) or not (“false”). It is initialized with value “false”.
-SREA (“Status Request Epoch”): an integer that indicates the last epoch when UA has
sent a “Status Request”.
-LEPMA (“List of Exposed PET Metadata”) : This list reflects the exposure of the user
(temporal and frequency information) and is used to store the metadata (e.g. the duration
9The need to adjust the algorithm to reflect policy changes is also stressed in [9]: “It is to be expected that the optimal
solution will likely involve a number of successive scenarios to reflect an early need to capture as many infections as
possible and a later need to avoid quarantining of too many people as the epidemic declines and re-introductions are
monitored.”
10Just to take an example, in a decentralized approach, where the risk calculation algorithm is computed on users’ devices,
the health authority is not aware of the number of exposed people. This information is essential both for statistical
purposes and to easily adjust the risk calculation algorithm.
11This table could be extended to include additional information useful to improve the risk scoring function or necessary for
the epidemiologists.
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and proximity of a contact to an infected person) necessary to compute the risk score. In
this version of the protocol, each element encodes the day when the user had a contact
with an infected user and the duration of that encounter. The information contained in
this list can be extended to include other types of data useful to compute the risk score,
such information about the environment (indoor or outdoor), signal strength,...
-ERSA (“Exposure Risk Score”) : Current UA’s exposure risk score.
c) The server:
i. generates an encryption key EKA
ii. sends IDA, EKA to UA
iii. uses EKA to encrypt
12 all elements of IDTable[IDA], except for IDA
iv. deletes EKA
Note that the server also stores all the AT tokens it has received to verify that they are only used
once13.
2.2. Encounter discovery
Figure 2: Device A broadcasts EBID = gA. Device B broadcasts EBID = gB. Device A computes
PET 1 = H(”1”|gB.A) and PET 2 = H(”2”|gB.A), stores PET 1 in RTLA and PET 2 in ETLA.
Device B computes PET 1 = H(”1”|gA.B) and PET 2 = H(”2”|gA.B), stores PET 1 in ETLB
and PET 2 in RTLB .
2.2.1. Protocol description
Each node A maintains two tables: an Exposure Token List, ETLA, and a Request Token List, RTLA.
At each epoch i of day day, node A:
1. deletes Ai−1 and EBIDA,i−1;
2. chooses randomly Ai and computes EBIDA,i = g
Ai ;
3. broadcasts regularly EBIDA,i over bluetooth;
4. cleans RTLA and ETLA by removing expired elements, i.e. elements that were included more than
CT days ago, where CT is the contagious period (typically 14 days).
At each encounter with node B, node A (see Figure 2):
1. collects EBIDB,i = g
Bi , from encounter B;
12We recommend the use of an authenticated encryption scheme.
13In practice the server can generate authorization tokens that are only valid for a certain number of days (by changing his
Public/Private key pair regularly), which would reduce the storage load on the server.
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2. if the encounter satisfies some conditions14, node A:
a) computes the duration of the encounter, tA,B ;
b) computes 2 PETs:
PET 1i = H(”1” | gAi·Bi)
and
PET 2i = H(”2” | gAi·Bi)
c) If (the bit-string gAi is greater than bit-string gBi)15:
- node A stores PET 1i in RTLA and the (PET
2
i , tA,B , day) tuple
16 in ETLA
17,
otherwise:
- node A stores PET 2i in RTLA and (PET
1
i , tA,B , day) tuple in ETLA
18.
3. deletes gBi ;
2.2.2. Why using two lists, RTL and ETL?
Device A encodes each encounter with B into 2 PETs, PET 1 and PET 2, that are stored in two different
lists, ETLA and RTLA. As we will see later, one of the PET tokens is used to query the server for
exposure and the other is uploaded to the server if A is diagnosed-positive.
Using two types of unlinkable PET tokens for the same encouter prevents the server from linking the
tokens used by A in its ESR REQ requests with the tokens that it uploads to the server (if diagnosed
positive). Without this protection, the server could used these links to reconnect together the tokens of
its EList that belong to A and derive A’s proximity graph.
Note also that B generates the same 2 PET tokens but stores them in its lists in the reverse order (see
Figure 2). Therefore the server cannot link the PET token that A and B use in their ESR REQ queries
for their encounter, but can still perform the PET matching if one of the users is diagnosed-positive and
uploads her ETL list.
2.2.3. PET Generation Synchronization
A device A, broadcasting EBIDA, that is in contact with another device B, broadcasting EBIDB , since
time tb generates a new PET token if:
1. A starts using a new EBID, EBIDA,i+1, at time te, or
2. A does not receive EBIDB anymore since time tf for more than a given period of time (value to be
defined). This scenario can occur when B has changed its EBID, has moved away from A or is
temporarily behind an obstacle.
In this case, device A generates a new PET to which it associates the duration19 (te − tb) or (tf − tb).
According to various situations, devices may generate several PET tokens for a single continuous proximity
encounter.
Figure 3 shows various PET tokens that can be generated by two devices A (Alice) and B (Bob),
taking into account the above rules, and the loose time synchronization between devices A and B. It
allows to understand the extent to which our proposal allows anonymous proximity encounters detection
in a truly decentralized context. Note that each node stores the duration of the encounter, together with
the corresponding PET token.
14Conditions could be based on the encounter duration, number of received EBIDs, signal strength, etc. - to be defined
with epidemiologists.
15This test can be generalized. A and B only need to implement a total ordering function that given 2 inputs I1 and I2
known by A and B outputs an order between A and B.
16Note that this tuple could be extended dynamically, upon request from the server, with information, such as reception
signal strength, that could be useful to the health authority compute the risk score.
17Node B does the inverse, i.e. it stores PET 2i in RTLB and (PET
1
A,i, tA,B , day) tuple in RTLB .
18Node B stores PET 1i in RTLB and (PET
2
A,i, tA,B , day) tuple in RTLB).
19To avoid generating and storing PET tokens that are very brief, it might be reasonable to only generate a PET token if
its encounter duration is larger than a certain value (for example, 2-3 minutes).
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Figure 3: PET Generation: this figure illustrates PET generation in DESIRE. The node A (resp. B)
generates a PET token when it changes its EBID or when it does not receive the EBID of
its encounter, node B (resp. node A), for a giving period of time (resulting from a change of
EBID of node B or node B moving away). In this example, node A starts broadcasting gA at
time T0. It encounters node B at time T0 + t0. At time T0 + t0 + t1, node A changes its EBID.
As a result, node A generates the PET token H(gB.A) and stores it together with its duration
t1. Similarly, at time T0 + t0 + t1, node B does not receive g
A anymore: it therefore generates
the PET token H(gA.B) and stores it together with its duration t1, and so on.
2.3. Infected node declaration
1. If user UA is tested and diagnosed COVID-positive at a hospital or medical office, she is proposed to
upload each element of her ETLA list to the server (this document does not specify the interactions
between AppA and the health authority since it can differ from one medical system to another
20).
Note that this upload is anonymous, in particular it does not reveal the identity of UA nor any of
its EBIDs to the server.
If insufficient precautions are taken, ETLA could potentially be used by the server to build the de-
identified social/proximity graph of the infected user. The aggregation of many such social/proximity
graphs may lead, under some conditions, to the de-anonymization of its nodes, which results in
the social graphs of the users. It is therefore necessary to ”break” the link between any two
elements if ETLA. Therefore, instead of uploading ETLA, our scheme uploads each of its elements
independently and in random order. Different solutions can be envisioned to achieve this goal:
• Each element of ETLA are sent to the server one by one using a Mixnet21. Upon reception of
these messages, the server won’t be able to associate them with a specific ETL if the upload is
spread over a long period of time.
• The ETLA is uploaded on a trusted server (for example at a hospital or health organization)
that mixes the elements of all infected users’ ETLs. The back-end server has only access to
the exposed entries via a specific API provided by the trusted server.
20One possible solution is that the user obtains an authorization code from the hospital or the medical office when it is
diagnosed COVID-positive. The User can then use this code to obtain N anonymous authorization tokens, where N is
the number of elements in UA’s ETL list (see Appendix A). UA can then used these tokens to upload each of ETLA’s
element one by one.
21Since all mobile telecom operators are using NAT, it should be studied when the use of a Mixnet or proxy is really needed.
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• The back-end server is equipped with some secure hardware component that processes the
uploads of the ETLs. The back-end server has only access to the exposed entries via a specific
API provided by the secure hardware module.
2. The server maintains a global list, EList, of all exposed (token, day, t) tuples (coming from all
infected users).
2.4. Exposure Status Request
In order to check whether user UA is ”at risk”, i.e., if she has encountered infected and contagious users
in the last CT days, application AppA regularly
22 sends ”Exposure Status” Requests (ESR REQ) to the
server for IDA. The server then computes a ”risk score” value. The server replies with a ESR REP
message that is set to ”1” when the user is ”at risk” (i.e., if the ”risk score” is larger than a threshold
value) or to ”0” otherwise.
1. Node A periodically sends to the server, via a TLS proxy, an ESR REQA,i message that contains
IDA, EKA, the PET tokens of RTLA.
2. The server retrieves IDTable[IDA], decrypts each of its elements with EKA.
3. The server verifies if (i− SREA), where i is the current epoch number, is smaller than a threshold
ESR min (this test is meant to limit the number of daily requests performed by UA). If this is the
case, the server returns an ESR REPA,i message with an error code. The server then encrypts each
element of IDTable[IDA] with EKA and erases EKA. Otherwise, it continues.
4. The server verifies the UNA flag. If UNA = true, the server returns the same ESR REPA,i message
set to ”1” (at risk of exposure)23. The server then encrypts each element of IDTable[IDA] with
EKA and erases EKA. Otherwise, it continues.
5. The server then checks whether any of the PET tokens of RTLA appear in any (token, day, t) tuples
of EList. If yes, the server removes the matching tuples from EList and adds all the (day, t) pairs
in the LEPMA list of IDTable[IDA].
6. The server computes an exposure risk score for user UA, stores
24 it in IDTable[IDA] (field ERSA).
7. Two situations are then possible:
a) If the computed score indicates that the user is at risk of exposure, the server sets UNA at
”true”. An ESR REPA,i message set to ”1” (at risk of exposure) is then returned to the user.
b) If the computed score does not indicate any significant risk, an ESR REPA,i message set to
”0” is returned to the user.
8. After sending the reply message, the server encrypts each element of IDTable[IDA] with EKA and
erases EKA.
9. If ESR REPA,i is set to ”1”:
- User, UA, receives a notification from AppA with some instructions (for example to go to the
hospital to get tested, to call a specific number or go on quarantine).
Note that, for a given user A, since the PET tokens used in the uploaded list, ETLA, and in the
requests, RTLA are different for the same encounters, the server can not link the elements and can not
build any proximity graph. Furthermore, the only information that leaks out of a request is the number
of elements, which could give some information about the number of encounters, of RTLA. One solution
is to set the number of elements in the request to a fixed value, T . If the number of elements of RTLA,
NA is smaller than T , A pads its request with (T −NA) bogus tokens. If NA is larger than T , A only
uses T elements of RTLA for its requests. Other solutions could be to encode the elements of RTLA into
a Bloom or Cuckoo filter.
22The queries are sent regularly and at most every ESR min epochs. If a user is allowed to perform N queries per day,
ESR min is defined as T = 86400/(N ∗ epoch duration sec).
23 Note that it is good practice for an application whose user is already notified ”at risk” to keep on sending ESR REQ
queries and receive ESR REQ messages to make this application traffic indistinguishable to any other application when
observing the generated network traffic.
24Note that server could also store the RTL tokens generated in the last CT in IDTable. That would save some bandwidth
(since a node would only need to send it daily token in its ESR REQ queries). In addtion, this would improve security
on the phone that would only store the daily tokens locally.
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2.5. Notified node management
When a node is notified at risk, its UNA flag is set to ”true” in IDTable. From this point on, the server
will process its ESR REQ queries as usual but will keep replying with a ESR REP message set to ”1”
regardless of the ESR REQ queries.
When set ”at risk”, the notified node has several options:
• She is tested and diagnosed as COVID-positive:
– In that case she can upload her ETLA list as described in Section 2.3.
– Independently she can inform the server that her identifier IDA was tested positive via a
specific protocol (not specified in this document). This notification25 is done independently of
the previous ETLA list upload and can not be linked together (the server cannot identify the
PET tokens that were uploaded by IDA).
• She is tested and diagnosed as COVID-negative:
– She can inform the server that her identifier IDA was tested negative via a specific protocol
(not specified in this document)26. As a result, the UNA flag is reset to ”false” on the server.
• She decides not to be tested or not to inform the server about the result of her test. In that case
her ”at risk” status will be reset automatically after a certain fixed period of time (3-4 days, value
to be defined).
In any case, an application that has been notified ”at risk” continues to send and receive EBIDs and
to compute PET s. This is required for instance when a user is waiting for a test result, if this latter turns
out to be negative: encounters continue to be recorded and as soon as the user unlocks her status at the
server, the updated exposure status can be computed without any gap in the history.
A user that was diagnosed positive should have the option to continue using the application as long as
she is contagious. During this period, she must regularly upload her ETL list to the server.
It is important to note that the above procedure needs to be discussed with epidemiologists and the
health authority, and is therefore subject to modifications.
3. Risk Analysis
- Server Data Breaches: The server only stores pseudonymous data. In addition, this information
is minimized and only used to compute the exposure risk scores. Furthermore, each entries in
IDTable of a device A is encrypted using a key EKA that is stored only by A and provided to the
server with the ESR REQ queries. As a result, in case of a data breach of the server, all useful
information will be encrypted. This risk associated with a data breach is then minimal.
- Passive Eavesdropping/Tracking (by malicious users and authority): Since PET tokens
are unique per encounters and are computed locally, passive eavesdroppers only get the EBIDs,
that are changing at every epoch. Furthermore, if the authority deploys some Bluetooth receivers, it
will not be able, as a result of the decisional Diffie–Hellman (DDH) assumption, to relate any EBID
(i.e., gAi) to any PET tokens. Passive tracking by the server or users is therefore not possible.
- Active Eavesdropping/Tracking (by malicious users): Active Eavesdropping/Tracking by
users is not possible.
- Active Eavesdropping/Tracking (by malicious authority): If the authority is active and
deploys Bluetooth devices that also broadcast their own EBIDs, containing for example gZ , the
target device, A, will generate and store the PET tokens H(”1”, gA· Z) and H(”2”, gA· Z). The
server’s devices can also generate the same tokens that the server could use to identify the target’s
ESR REQ messages and possibly track some of his locations. Since the ESR REQ queries of a
25Note that this notification must contain an anonymous Authorisation Token to prove that she was actually tested positive.
26Informing the backend server about the results of the COVID tests could be very important to define and calibrate the
risk score functions.
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node are linkable27 with enough of these tracking devices, the server could possibly re-identify some
users28. This attack can be mitigated with the solution proposed in Section 4.
- Reconstructing social interaction graphs (by malicious authority): When a user A is
diagnosed COVID-positive, he anonymously uploads all elements of its ETLA independently.
Consequently, the server is not able to make any links, neither between the user and the uploaded
PET tokens nor between the uploaded PET tokens. When user A queries the server for its exposure
status, the server is able to link IDA to all PET tokens contained in the ESR REQ query. However,
the PET tokens used in the ESR REQ queries are different from the tokens uploaded to the server
if she ever gets diagnosed. Consequently, the server is not able to infer any links between exposed
tokens in its EList and tokens in requests. Furthermore when two users A and B who exchanged
EBIDs and built associated PET tokens, request the server with different tokens. The server is
thus not able to link any tokens in different requests.
- Infected Node Re-identification (by malicious user): User can not identify infected contacts
since this information is kept on the server and users only get an exposure risk score. However, the
“one entry” attack29, that is inherent to all schemes is still possible. This attack could be mitigated
by:
- requiring users to register in order to limit Sybil attacks;
- limiting the number of requests that each node can perform per day and limiting it even more
when a user is notified ”at risk”. This counter-measure limits the scale of the attack;
- using a probabilistic notification scheme, as presented in Appendix B;
- sending a ESR REP set to 1 only if the number of exposed tokens of the requesting user is
strictly larger than 1;
- having the server verify that the requests contain at least N tokens before providing a reply
”1”. However, this counter-measure is not very strong since it does not prevent an adversary
from using fake tokens with the target token.
- Replay attacks: not possible since it is assumed that the communication is symmetrical. For
example, if a malicious node, Eve, replays the EBIDC to A, A will compute and store the
corresponding PET 1 and PET 2. However, C won’t have these values in his RTL and ETL tables.
- Relay attacks: only possible within, at most, one epoch.
- False Alert Injection Attacks: the pollution is an attack where a malicious node colludes with a
diagnosed user to include the identifiers of some victims in his contact list. The goal of the malicious
adversary is to make the app of a target victim raise false alerts. This attack requires that the
colluding user and the victim interact (to compute their PETs). Such attacks are therefore only
possible via a relay attack, i.e. only within an epoch.
4. Towards a State-less DESIRE
In DESIRE, the server stores some information about registered users. The information is minimal and
is securely stored. We believe that this feature is a strength of our scheme since it allows to mitigate some
attacks (by controlling the number of registered users and limiting the request frequency). It also allows
the health authority to compute and update the risk score according to the evolving situation, it provides
information to the health authority about user exposures that could be very valuable to optimize the risk
score function, as discussed Section 1.4.
Having said that, it is possible to transform DESIRE into a state-less system where the server would
be a mere ”matching machine” between the PET tokens that are uploaded by infected users and the
tokens that are contained in the ESR REQ queries.
The protocol would operate as follows:
27The ESR REQ contains the ID of the requesting user.
28Although this attack is technically possible, we should acknowledge that malicious authorities have probably more efficient
ways to track users if they want to (such as cellphones, wifi, etc).
29In this attack, the adversary has only one entry, corresponding to UserT , in her local lists (this can easily be achieved by
keeping the Bluetooth interface off, switching it on when the adversary is next her victim and then switching it off again).
When the adversary is notified ”at risk”, she learns that UserT was diagnosed COVID-positive.
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- Application Initialization: Users do not need to register to the server. They however need to
obtain CT different anonymous authorization tokens, AT , per day. Each of these authorisation
tokens should only be valid for a specific day and could be obtained, in batch, during registration30.
- Encounter Discovery: same as in the regular DESIRE protocol.
- Infected Node Declaration: same as in the regular DESIRE protocol.
- Exposure Status Request: users query the server with unlinkable ESR REQ queries, where each
of them contains a subset of different RTLA’s elements. Each ESR REQ query can, for example,
contain the PET tokens generated during the same day. In this case, on each day di, a user sends
CT different and unlinkable ESR REQ queries (one containing the tokens generated during di,
one containing the tokens generated during di−1, . . . , one containing the tokens generated during
di−CT ).
The server processes each of these ESR REQ queries independently, by checking whether any tokens
contained in the request appears in its list of exposed tokens, EList. It then compute the resulting
exposure risk score of each requests and sends the result back to the requested user.
Note that with this extension, the server cannot compute the user’s ”global” exposure risk scores anymore
but only unlinkable ”daily” risk scores. The App obtains CT different risk scores (for the different CT
previous days) that it needs to aggregate into a global one. This also implies that all apps have to include
an aggregation function that might need to be updated regularly.
Lastly, it is also possible to fully decentralize the risk score assessment by publishing to all Apps the
exposed PET tokens contained in EList of the server. The resulting scheme would then be very similar
to other so-called ”decentralized” schemes, such as DP3T [12]. However, we are not favorable to this
approach since it would decrease resiliency against infected node re-identification. Furthermore, fully
decentralizing the risk score computation could lead to the generation of many uncontrollable notifications.
This could have a dramatic impact in the population, reduce the trust in the system, and consequently,
its adoption rate (see Section 1.4).
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A. Authorization Token Generation
We assume that the server has a RSA certificate with public key (e, n) and private key (d, n).
User ------> phone_number ------> server
Server computes ID = H(phone number) and checks that ID does not exist. Server sends a PIN code
to the User via SMS (the SMS is used to verify that the user owns the phone number). Note that the PIN
code could be obtained via another mechanism, if the user does not have a sim card. For example, it
could be delivered by doctors or the medical authority via, for example, email. The SMS is used to verify
that the User owns the phone number.
The user generates two random numbers, c and R, computes ce.H(R) (mod n) and sends:
User ------> PIN, c^e.H(R) (mod n) ------> server
The server verifies PIN, computes REP = (ce.R)d = c.H(R)d (mod n) and sends:
User <------ REP = c. H(R)^d (mod n) <------ Client
The user computes σ = REP/c = H(R)d (mod n) and obtains the authorization token (R, σ).
Server deletes phone number and the REP .
The user can then use his authorization token to prove that she is a registered user when sending
ESR REQ queries or during the registration phase.
However, although the user reveals her phone number (to verify that there is only one application
registered per smartphone to limit Sybil attacks), the server is unable to link the user’s phone number
with the generated authorization token (it cannot link the token (R, σ) to any phone number.)
Note that a user that uninstall the application, won’t be able to register a new application at a later
time. If this is problematic, a solution would be to authorize a limited number (i.e., 2 or 3) of user
registrations per phone number.
14
B. Towards Probabilistic Notifications
As described in previous work [3, 15], all proximity-tracking schemes are vulnerable to the ”one entry”
attack. In this attack, the adversary has only one entry, corresponding to UserT , in her locall lists
31.
When the adversary is notified ”at risk”, she learns that UserT was diagnosed COVID-positive. As
described in Section 3, ROBERT − v2 proposes some mitigation measures. However, we consider that the
only way to prevent this attack is to use probabilistic notifications in order to introduce some ”deniability”.
In such a scheme, the server that receives a ESR REQ message would reply:
• ”0” (i.e., not at risk) if the User’s ID is not in the list of exposed IDs.
• ”1” if the User’s ID is in the list of exposed IDs or if it is randomly selected by the server (the
server selects additional users to receive a ”1” reply with probability p).
As a result, if the user receives a ”1” back, she does not know whether it is because she has been exposed
or whether she has been randomly selected by the server. Since the user cannot query the server anymore
(as it already received a reply ”1” back), she cannot send additional requests to refine his attack. We
acknowledge that this attacks remains possible by n colluding nodes that target one user. In this case,
the n colluding nodes will all get a ”1” back and will find out the exposure status of their victim. The
scalability of the attack is however reduced since it now requires n adversaries to target one victim.
The side effect of this proposal is that it introduces some false positives, i.e., some people will be notified
whereas they are not really ”at risk” (at least according to the proximity risk score). Is this acceptable or
not? There are several elements of answer to this question. First, we need to acknowledge that proximity
tracing is not perfect, and that there will be anyway false positives or false negatives. In this context, is
it really problematic to add 5% or 10% more false positives? Second, the answer to this question may
also depend on what the application is used for. If the App is used to target users that should get tested,
we believe that testing 5 or 10% more users randomly should be quite acceptable. If the App is used to
notify users to go in quarantine, false positives could be more problematic...
C. Bluetooth communications
Identifiers broadcasted over Bluetooth, EBIDs, are now larger than 16 bytes and can therefore not be
carried by an advertisement packet alone. We propose two solutions to transmit this larger message over
Bluetooth.
C.1. A scan response based approach
To transmit the 256-bit identifier EBIDA,i over BLE, we propose to use the scan response mechanism of
BLE [10, Vol 6, Part B, sec. 4.4.2.3]. The 256-bit identifier is to be split into two blocks of 16-bytes, the
first block is included in the advertising data of ADV IND packets while the second block is included in the
in the advertising data of SCAN RSP packets (see Figure 4).
C.1.1. Identifier segmentation
The 256 bit identifier EBIDA,i is split in to two blocks : IDL = LSB16(EBIDA,i) and IDH = MSB16(EBIDA,i),
where MSB16(x) and LSB16(x) are functions that return respectively the 16 most significant bytes and
the 16 least significant bytes of x.
C.1.2. Dedicated services
Each of those blocks is configured as data for a service. To this aim, two dedicated services are defined:
• Proximity notification service 1 (PNS1), with 16bit UUID 0xFD0132, will carry IDL along with
metadata (protocol version, corrective gain for Tx power and reserved bytes).
• Proximity notification service 2 (PNS1), with 16bit UUID 0xFD02, will carry IDH .
31This attack can easily be achieved by keeping the Bluetooth interface off, switching it on when the adversary is next her
victim and then switching it off again.
32The value of those UUID is not definitive and will need to be selected in collaboration with the by Bluetooth SIG.
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Flags
Length
Complete 16-bit
Service UUID Service Data - 16-bit UUID
Type Flags Length Type Service UUID Length Type Service Data
0x02 0x01
(Flag)
0x1A 0x03 0x03
(comp
16-bit
service
UUID)
0xFD01
(Risk notification
service 1)
0x17 0x16
(Service
Data -
16-bit
UUID)
0xFD01
(Proximity
notification
service 1)
16 bytes
ID_L
(First part of the
identifier)
ADV_IND (31 bytes)
SCAN_RSP (24 bytes)
3 bytes 4 bytes 24 bytes
Complete 16-bit
Service UUID Service Data - 16-bit UUID
Length Type Service UUID Length Type Service Data
0x03 0x03
(comp
16-bit
service
UUID)
0xFD02
(Proximity
notification
service 2)
0x13 0x16
(Service
Data -
16-bit
UUID)
0xFD02
(Proximity
notification
service 2)
16 bytes
ID_H
(Second part of the
identifier)
4 bytes 20 bytes
1 byte
Version
1 byte
Gtx
2 bytes
Reserved
Figure 4: Payload of the ADV IND and SCAN RESP packets used to transmit the 32 bytes identifier.
C.1.3. Advertising and scan response payload
The payload of advertising packets is composed of:
• Flags (3 bytes)
• Complete 16-bit UUID (4 bytes) carrying the UUID of Proximity notification service 1 (0xFD01)
• Service Data - 16-bit UUID (22 bytes) carrying the data for Proximity notification service 1, i.e.
IDL (16 bytes), protocol version (1 byte), corrective gain for Tx power (1 byte), and 2 reserved
bytes.
The payload of scan responses is composed of:
• Complete 16-bit UUID (4 bytes) carrying the UUID of Proximity notification service 2 (0xFD02)
• Service Data - 16-bit UUID (20 bytes) carrying the data for Proximity notification service 2, i.e.
IDH (16 bytes)
We assumed that the rotation of EBID is synchronized with the device address. Therefore, the two
blocks IDL and IDH can be linked via the device address. If it were not the case, an additional identifier
must be included in the payload of advertising and scan response packets to allow the reconstruction of
the EBID.
C.1.4. Advertising and scanning
As stated in Bluetooth specifications [10, Vol 6, Part B, sec. 4.4.2.3], after receiving an advertisement packet
(ADV IND PDU), a scanner can send a scan request (SCAN REQ PDU) or request additional information
about the advertiser. If the advertiser receives a SCAN REQ PDU that contains its device address it shall
reply with a SCAN RSP PDU on the same primary advertising channel index.
Devices are to be configured to follow this request response mechanism. More specifically:
• A device should always send a scan request to in response to a new advertisement packet.
• Upon reception of a scan request, a device should always respond with as scan response.
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C.2. Fragmentation approach
Another solution is to rely on splitting the EBIDA,i in two blocks and transmitting those blocks alternatively
in advertising packets.
More specifically, the EBIDA,i is divided into two blocks IDL and IDH following the approach presented
in Section C.1.1. Those blocks are transmitted in the payload of advertisement packets (ADV IND PDU)
as service data associated to a dedicated service (e.g., Risk notification service 1 with UUID 0xFD01, as
presented in Section C.1.2). The service data in transmitted advertising packets alternatively take the
value of IDL and IDH .
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